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Night of the Unexpected: a Critique of the ‘Uncanny’ and its Apotheosis within Cultural 
and Social Theory 
  
Since 1995, when Martin Jay cautioned against the rise of the uncanny as a ‘supercharged’ 
word, the unheimlich has not ceased to make itself at home across a range of disciplines 
including cultural studies, history, politics, ethics, aesthetics and sociology.1 Works applying 
the concept have included The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely 
(1994); The National Uncanny: Indian Ghosts and American Subjects (1999); Sites of the 
Uncanny: Paul Celan, Specularity and the Visual Arts (2007); Uncanny Modernity: Cultural 
Theories, Modern Anxieties (2008); Monstrous Society: Reciprocity, Discipline and the 
Political Uncanny c. 1780-1848 (2009) and Queer Uncanny (2012). There are of course 
different critical tendencies represented here and the uncanny is frequently linked to satellite 
terms (‘spectre’, ‘ghost’, ‘haunting’) which are in some cases used interchangeably 
(Bergland’s The National Uncanny is concerned with American Indian ‘ghosts’, while 
Derrida suggested his Spectres of Marx could have been subtitled ‘Marx – Das 
Unheimliche’).2 However, the net effect has been to promote a new syntax of interpretation 
aimed at disturbing the boundaries of ‘conventional’ historical, cultural and sociological 
analysis.  
 
It is hard not to note an imperialising aspect to this success. Uncanny theory tends to break 
down the boundaries between itself and other cultural theories, to absorb them into the 
uncanny. According to Nicholas Royle, the queer is uncanny,3 psychoanalysis is uncanny,4 
while the uncanny is a way of ‘beginning to think about culture, philosophy, religion, 
literature, science, politics in the present’.5 If all critique challenges boundaries, runs the 
underlying assumption, then all critique – all theories of alienation, repression, or ‘otherness’ 
– are or should be uncanny. But the researcher wanting not merely to extend this form of 
theorisation, but to challenge, or take stock of its implications, is poorly served. In the first 
place, the emphasis in uncanny criticism has been on its ubiquity and irreducibility. Royle’s 
The Uncanny, which more than any other work put uncanny studies on the map, was an 
exercise in demonstrating the sheer uncontainability of the concept, while for Anneleen 
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Masschelein, it ‘affects and haunts everything, it is in constant transformation and cannot be 
pinned down’.6  
 
Masschelein’s work is the most comprehensive attempt at a genealogy of uncanny theory, 
and yet, though she acknowledges the concept underwent a fundamental  transformation in 
the 1990s, she chooses ‘not to focus on the heyday between 1980-2000’, instead filling in its 
anterior life in criticism from the early-twentieth century up to the 1970s.7 But this leaves us 
with something of a phantom genealogy. For Masschelein, the uncanny is throughout ‘the 
Freudian uncanny’ (this assumption is typical in the literature), yet she acknowledges, rightly, 
that it can no longer be considered a psychoanalytic concept and ‘one may even wonder if 
this was ever the case’.8 Despite an ever-growing corpus on the ‘psychoanalytic uncanny’, 
the ‘uncanny’ is not a theoretical concept within psychoanalysis itself. It has no entry in 
Laplanche and Pontalis’ Language of Psychoanalysis, Charles Rycroft’s A Critical 
Dictionary of Psychoanalysis or Stephen Frosh’s Key Concepts in Psychoanalysis.9 A surer 
narrative might trace the impulse within contemporary theory back to Derrida’s work and to 
deconstruction – this is particularly so for Royle, who gives Derrida a major presence within 
his overview of 2003. And yet, whatever emerges as a more autonomous uncanny or spectral 
theory in the 1990s is greatly shifted from that which went under the name of deconstruction 
in the 1970s-80s.  
 
Rather than tracking the ‘psychoanalytic uncanny’, then, this article concentrates on that 
watershed in order to probe the nature of the shift, and reflect on the influx of new elements 
which have given the uncanny its characteristic impetus within the contemporary scene. 
Crucially, what is neglected in the association of the uncanny with both psychoanalysis and 
deconstruction is the input from Heidegger, which fundamentally inflected Derrida’s own 
turn to spectres at this point, and turned the uncanny from a more ‘contained’ concept to 
something approaching a ‘counter-ontology’ of human culture – paradoxically, the very stuff 
of life. For Royle, the ‘logic of haunting and ghosts’ is the ‘very condition of thinking and 
feeling’.10  
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I will also examine the way the uncanny began to be mobilised on cultural and sociological 
terrain as a specifically ethical or political tool: a site of historical mourning or sociological 
resistance. In the same decade in which its fortunes took off as a critical discourse aimed at 
the subversion of cultural and conceptual and hegemonies, something else was also 
promoted, uneasily redolent of a sublime ontology, a new eschatology: ‘This logic of 
haunting would not be merely larger and more powerful than an ontology or a thinking of 
Being… It would harbour within itself… eschatology and teleology themselves.’11 Again, the 
influence from Heidegger was significant but has been under-theorised. In all the clamour 
over the inherently disturbing and in-coercible logic of the uncanny (what could be more 
subversive than a fusion of Freud, deconstruction and Gothic horror) there has been little 
analysis since Jay of its potentially reactionary function within contemporary cultural theory. 
 
What travels under the banner of uncanny cultural or social theory has become increasingly 
abstract or transcendental, increasingly estranged from the ‘particular’ (despite claims that the 
uncanny allows the ghost of lost or absent particularities to resonate from beyond the 
historical or sociological grave); and increasingly depoliticised (this, despite claims from the 
early 1990s onwards that the uncanny had absorbed both Marx and Benjamin; that it 
epitomises what is salvageable or ultimately progressive in those radical traditions). Though 
there is no space here to explore the full historical context of this development, I will suggest 
that the major shift in the fortunes of the uncanny – its popularity, its disciplinary spread, its 
bolder theoretical pitch – took place very specifically in this context of the rewriting of the 
theoretical map of Marxism at the end of the 1980s, though the significance of this moment, 
and the turn to Heidegger at precisely this point, has increasingly been lost in the attempt to 
roll the logic of the uncanny further and further back across history, as a phenomenon without 
beginning or end. 
 
II 
 
As a way of approaching the transformation of the concept in the late-80s, I want to go back 
to the 1970s to examine two new strands of interest in the uncanny which emerged at that 
time – both at this point linked to deconstruction – and which might seem to indicate 
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something of its future direction in cultural theory. However, what seemed uncanny before 
the concept turned ‘spectral’ had a markedly different function in critical discourse compared 
with the situation later on. The first example is the increasing attention paid to Freud’s 1919 
essay ‘Das Unheimliche’ (‘The “Uncanny”’) which presents an analysis of E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s tale ‘The Sandman’. Instead of developing a specific ‘uncanny theory’, Freud 
used the investigation of uncanny incidents (particularly Hoffmann’s macabre theme of a 
Sandman who tears out children’s eyes) as a way of informally approaching the concepts of 
repetition compulsion and castration anxiety, feeling his way towards a theorization of the 
death drive which arrived the following year with Beyond the Pleasure Principle. During the 
1970s and 1980s, a cluster of ‘returns’ and renegotiations of this text emerged, primarily in 
France from theorists influenced by Derrida, including some footnotes in Derrida’s own ‘La 
double séance’ (1970) which provide some of the earliest examples of this kind of renewed 
engagement with the uncanny in theory. Other examples are Hélène Cixous’ ‘Fiction and Its 
Phantoms: A Reading of Freud’s Das Unheimliche’, originally from 1972,12 and Sarah 
Kofman’s ‘The Double is/ and the Devil: The Uncanniness of The Sandman (Der 
Sandmann)’ (1974) which reverses Freud’s reading, so that Hoffmann’s theme of losing 
one’s eyes is not about symbolic castration, but about the escape from a world of artistic 
mimicry towards the vitality of the sexual.13 Another is provided in Neil Herz’s ‘Freud and 
the Sandman’ which addresses ‘the rivalry between literature and psychoanalysis’ and ‘the 
power of one to interpret and neutralize the other’.14 Hoffmann’s text, for Herz, is in part a 
parody of the tropes of Romantic fiction, but Freud represses all those aspects of Hoffman’s 
tale that point up its nature as a rhetorical performance. All these articles return to Freud’s 
‘The Uncanny’ in order to give counter-readings or meta-interpretations, and to redefine the 
balance of power between psychoanalysis and other disciplines (philosophy, literature, 
aesthetics), but they do not yet develop an ‘uncanny’ theory.15 
 
My other example is from the circle of literary critics based at Yale, for whom the uncanny 
emerges not as a Freudian text, but as a banner for an American school of deconstruction, 
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with no overt connection to psychoanalysis at all. In a series of essays of the mid- to late-70s 
(particularly a couple of articles on Wallace Stevens’ poem ‘The Rock’) J. Hillis Miller 
started to use the categories ‘canny’ and ‘uncanny’ to define two different kinds of 
criticism.16 Miller himself, along with Paul de Man, Geoffrey Hartmann and Derrida are 
defined as uncanny critics, while Socrates is the emblem of canny criticism which follows 
‘agreed-upon rules of procedure and measurable results’ and whose latterday proponents are 
semioticians such as Genette, Barthes and Jakobson.17 This terminology was taken up by 
Hartman in his Preface to Deconstruction and Criticism (1979), and again by Christopher 
Norris in Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (1991). 
 
Interestingly, Miller’s description of the uncanny not only differs from Freud’s but jars with 
the way the uncanny is theorised in the post-90s and has generally been written out of that 
history, even for theorists, like Royle, keen to establish links with deconstruction. Part of the 
reason for the absence of Miller on the contemporary scene is the formalist bent of his 
criticism. For Miller, there are various key figures or tropes in Stevens’ poem ‘The Rock’ – a 
pair of lovers, the natural cycle, and so on – but it is impossible to tell which one the poem is 
actually about. ‘Each scene is both literal and metaphorical, both the ground of the poem and 
a figure on the ground... in a fathomless mise en abyme.’18 This ambiguity is extended 
beyond the poem to confound the practice of criticism per se. The attempt to escape from 
words to something more ontologically substantial – a viewpoint from which one might 
ground an understanding of experience – fails, as each potential framework dissolves in the 
uncertainties of interpretation.  It is this ‘perpetual reversal’ or ‘oscillation’, in which points 
of solidity become points of groundlessness, and vice versa, which Miller asserts as the 
central motif of uncanny criticism.19 Theirs becomes a ‘labyrinthine attempt to escape from 
the labyrinth of words’.20 ‘Labyrinth’ and ‘mise en abyme’ were the insignia of the uncanny 
in deconstruction before the advent of spectres and haunting. A similar anxiety about impasse 
crops up repeatedly in Derrida’s work of the 1980s, but in The Post Card it is a problem from 
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which he seeks to distance himself: ‘I have never wanted to abuse the abyss, nor, above all, 
the mise “en abyme”. I do not believe in it very much’.21  
 
The point about both these 1970s manifestations of the uncanny is that they remain within a 
world of distinct but undecidable positions. For Miller, the suspense of meaning oscillates 
between specific alternatives (as ‘reversal, interchange, doubling’).22 Similarly for Herz, 
Freud’s Unheimliche is an instance of ‘the uncanny’ because the story shifts back and forth 
between the registers of the psychological and the literary (his image for this is, once more, 
the mise en abyme, which simulates ‘wildly uncontrollable repetition’).23 However, a few 
things happened in the late 1980s which start to redefine the uncanny as a theoretical tool, 
and give it a new impetus which will lead beyond both psychoanalysis and deconstruction 
towards a new uncanny theory.   
 
The new element that enters in is firstly the language of the phantom, the spectral the ghostly, 
canonized in Derrida’s Spectres of Marx (1994). In Hillis Miller and in Herz there is nothing 
‘ghostly’ about the uncanny. But equally, ghosts were not so central a motif in Derrida’s 
earlier work – they are barely present in Writing and Difference, Of Grammatology, or 
Margins of Philosophy, while The Post Card, published in 1987, still has relatively little to 
say about ghosts, even where it is concerned with Freud, repetition and revenance. 
Exceptions must be made for Derrida’s dialogue with the work of Abraham and Torok (going 
back to an early version of his Foreward to their The Wolf Man’s Magic Words, published in 
The Georgia Review in 1977), and for his performance in Ken McMullen’s film Ghost Dance 
(1983) in which he lectures on Abraham and Torok’s concept of the phantom, and states that 
cinema is the ‘art of ghosts’ (there is now a whole sub-genre of uncanny literature devoted to 
the experience of film, including Uncanny Bodies and The Uncanny Gaze). However, 
Derrida’s comments very much link such phantoms still either to psychoanalytic theories of 
mourning, or to the technology of image production. Again, the uncanny does not yet 
constitute a ‘general’ theory. Yet by 1993 Derrida could say ‘the logic of spectrality’ is 
inseparable from ‘the very motif... of deconstruction’.24  
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In the same period, the link with the spectral coincided with increasing attention paid, in 
literary and cultural criticism, to the aesthetics of the sublime and to the Gothic (Terry 
Castle’s The Female Thermometer: Eighteenth-century Culture and the Invention of the 
Uncanny, and Peter de Bolla’s The Discourse of the Sublime are indicative texts). As the 
uncanny cross-fertilised with Derrida’s ‘ghost’ and ‘spectre’ (and marginally with Torok’s 
‘Notes on the Phantom’, translated into English at this time) it started to absorb more and 
more associations from Gothic literature. Cultural theory experienced something of a tectonic 
shift whereby theory itself turned ‘Gothic’, and tropes from gothic literature and weird tales 
(vampires, zombies, phantoms) started to function ambiguously not as objects for 
interpretation but as themselves theoretical tools useful in undermining the distinction 
between the symbolic and the literal, phenomena and their conceptualisation. Behind this one 
might also discern an impulse to emancipate cultural theory from its dependence on 
historicist, political, sociological or philosophical paradigms, and to develop the uncanny as a 
truly ‘home-grown’ meta-theory which could be promoted beyond literary and aesthetic 
studies as a transformation of cultural theory in general. 
 
From this constellation of trends there also emerged a growing connection to the sublime in 
the Burkean sense – the sublimity which attaches to representations of obscurity and excess, 
the strange and the unexpected – and this manifests a significant shift in the theoretical idiom 
of the uncanny. The emphasis on the ghostly and the obscure within theory (rather than as 
objects of literary analysis) radicalised the attempt to escape the boundaries of formalism and 
specificity in criticism. Unlike the mise en abyme, the uncanny no longer succumbs to the 
impasse of describing itself too completely. The spectral, for Julian Wolfreys, is ‘irreducible 
to any formal description’.25 Ironically, one of the accusations which Derrida directs at 
Francis Fukuyama in Spectres of Marx, is that ‘he oscillates confusedly between two 
irreconcilable discourses’,26 – that is to say, the former description of uncanny criticism by 
Miller, now becomes something to be repudiated from the vantage of the uncanny as spectre. 
 
Finally, the shift of the uncanny towards the spectral coincides with a much stronger 
association between the uncanny and modes of temporality. Deferral, from early on, was an 
issue for reflection in Derrida’s work, forming part of the condition of differance, while 
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considerations of Nachträglichkeit in psychoanalysis go back to Freud’s first works on 
hysteria. However, such temporal concepts are now reworked as part of a general 
uncanny/spectral paradigm which thereby acquires a broader ontological cast. This shift is 
most clearly visible in Derrida’s work of the early 90s in which a set of gothic tropes are 
united with different tense structures to yield a set of uncanny temporalities: revenant (both 
‘spectre’ and ‘that which returns’); déjà vu (uncanny anteriority – ‘The Uncanny is what will 
have come back’);27 ‘time-out-of-joint’ (a phrase haunted by the ghost of Hamlet’s father); 
and ‘l’avenir’ (both the future and the spectral sense of what is to come – ‘The future can 
only be for ghosts’).28 It is on the basis of these temporalities that Derrida will 
reconceptualise history, ethics and justice in terms of ‘haunting’. 
 
These shifts in emphasis come across in many of the readings of Freud’s ‘Das Unheimliche’ 
after the late-80s, which become noticeably more radical and more concerned to  elicit – not 
the death drive, or Romantic irony – but the uncanny itself, as a condition of all theorisation. 
For Samuel Weber ‘The Sandman’ marks the spot where ‘presence and absence’ can no 
longer be clearly distinguished, while the uncanny ‘happens’ according to a temporality that 
distinguishes it from the closure of empirical events.29 For Julian Wolfreys, ‘The uncanny is 
thus uncanny in itself’, and ‘Freud’s discourse can in no way control its haunting or spectral 
condition’;30 and for Royle, Freud’s article ‘keeps trying to lay certain ghosts to rest, but they 
keep coming back’.31  
 
III 
 
What is the significance of this shift towards the spectral and the historical (deconstruction 
for Royle is now ‘uncanny history’)?32 What changes does this bring about in the function of 
the uncanny? Much of it, as we have seen, hinges on tendencies in Derrida’s work – 
according to Wolfreys, the whole turn to the uncanny as ‘spectral’ is arguably because of 
Spectres of Marx.33 And yet this does not make it a tendency being carried forward from 
deconstruction where, as we have seen, the ‘uncanny’ is implicated in tropes of 
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undecideability, the labyrinth and mise en abyme; nor is it primarily a function of Derrida’s 
interest in Abraham and Torok. Rather, Derrida’s new invocation of ghosts and revenance 
coincides with an increasing accommodation to the work of Heidegger. It is Heidegger’s use 
of the word Geist that is the central subject of 1987’s Of Spirit, and he is a guiding presence 
throughout Spectres of Marx, in which Derrida repeats a phrase from The Post Card: ‘Freud 
and Heidegger, I conjoin them within me like two great ghosts’.34 Royle, Masschelein and 
many others note this joining of Marx and Heidegger in Spectres of Marx, and count Marx 
and Heidegger serially in their list of uncanny authors, alongside Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. 
But the significance of this turn from Marx to Heidegger in the context of the early 1990s has 
been greatly underplayed. 
 
There is another tradition of the uncanny coming to the fore here which has a quite different 
context from that of Freud, and this is Heidegger’s Unheimlichkeit, which already in Being 
and Time is used to evoke a primordial experience of alienation within mass culture. Dasein 
[being there] has lost the ‘authentic potentiality for Being its Self’ insofar as it has fallen into 
the world.35 Knowledge of this fall has itself been covered up by allowing oneself to be 
immersed in the ‘groundlessness of the inauthentic being of the “they”’, where the ‘they’ 
stands partly for ‘public conscience’, the mass, the norm.36 In this condition one may hear the 
call [Ruf] (modelled on a religious calling) which is a call ‘to one’s own self’.37 The caller is 
‘Dasein in its uncanniness’, that is, an inner recognition that one is primordially ‘not at home’ 
in modern mass society.38 But it is during Heidegger’s lecture courses of the 1930s and 40s – 
the Introduction to Metaphysics (1935), the lectures on Holderlin’s hymn ‘Der Ister’ (1942), 
and on Parmenides (1942-3) – that the uncanny moves centre-stage. In all these texts 
Heidegger draws an account of ontology from the second choral ode in Sophocles’ Antigone 
which begins: ‘Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing / beyond the human being prevails more 
uncannily’.39 
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Even though an ‘uncanny’ critic like Hillis Miller alludes to Heidegger (in the essay on 
Stevens he describes the paradoxical structure of the poem as ‘in fact the traditional 
metaphysical structure of alethia, the appearance of something visible out of the abyss of 
truth’40) there are features of Heidegger’s uncanny which seem rather remote from whatever 
was going on at Yale in the 1970s. Firstly, Heidegger places great emphasis on the uncanny 
as the ‘violent’ and ‘powerful’. This uncanny is excessive and sublime (which greatly 
facilitated the links to be made between the Heideggerean uncanny and tropes from Gothic 
fiction in the 1990s).41 Deinon (the Greek word Heidegger translates with Unheimlich) is the 
terrible ‘in the sense of the overpowering power which compels panic fear’.42 Secondly, for 
Heidegger, something far more positive was intended than simply that which eludes formal 
representation. The uncanny in these lectures of the 1930-40s is a description of the ‘essence’ 
of the human [Menschenwesens, Wesensgrund]: essence both because the human being is the 
‘uncanniest of the uncanny’,43 but also because this vision of man as the uncanny has a 
foundational place in Western culture as Heidegger understands it. Heidegger talks about 
‘greatness of historical will’, and suggests ‘the beginning is the strangest and mightiest’.44 
There is, then, something decisive, foundational, constitutive about this uncanny, which goes 
far beyond Miller’s troubling of the formal boundaries of critical interpretation – it in fact 
compensates for the latter’s ‘undecideability’ with a sense of the excess required for decision 
itself. 
  
For both Heidegger and Derrida the uncanny or spectral exceeds the present and the familiar. 
It is disturbing but also generative, existing beyond representation perhaps, but able in some 
ways to constitute experience, or function as reality’s sublime and inaccessible source. Thus 
Derrida appeals to l’avenir (the uncanny future) as that which ‘overflows… the entire field of 
being and beings, and the entire field of history’,45 and also to the ‘irruption of a future that is 
absolutely non-reappropriable’.46 Though it might be hasty to interpret this irruption directly 
as a historical ‘force’, it foregrounds a notion of historical grounds and historical potential. 
For Heidegger man is ‘the most unheimlich of beings because he harbours such a beginning 
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in which everything all at once bursts from superabundance into the overpowering’47. For 
Derrida, there is a ‘violence that interrupts time, disarticulates it, displaces it out of its natural 
lodging’.48  
 
What I want to suggest is that the tropes of temporality start to push the theory decisively 
away from the scepticism of deconstruction as a critical practice and more towards a sublime 
and enigmatic counter-ontology which might form the basis for new representations of 
history and culture: a counter-ontology, because different modes of time become repositories 
for qualitatively different experiences: ‘the unforeseeable, the incalculable, indeed the 
impossible’.49 Sometimes ‘beyond’ is conceived as a general displacement within presence, 
more akin to the notion of differance. But more often than not it is understood to be another 
‘dimension’ or opening, dis-junct from the present and breaking into it unexpectedly. The 
idea of the spectre escapes, writes Wolfreys, ‘even as its apparitional instance arrives from 
some other place’.50 Deconstruction for Royle becomes ‘the opening of the future itself, a 
future which does not allow itself to be modalized or modified into the form of the present’.51 
These formulations are all rather different from the more formal and ahistorical ‘fabric of 
traces referring endlessly to something other than itself’ of an earlier phase.52 The future and 
the past are sites of loss and expectation, ontologically undergirding our world, in secret 
communication with each other, but for the moment inaccessible or unrepresentable for us. 
 
Much of this way of temporalising and structuring the uncanny, insofar as it has become 
prevalent as ‘uncanny theory’ (particularly under Royle’s influence) comes from Derrida; it is 
the leitmotif of Spectres of Marx, the essay which advances ‘into the unknown of that which 
must remain to come’: ‘what stands in front of it (Marxism) must also precede it like its 
origin’.53 But Derrida has in turn taken over many of these temporal tropes directly from 
Heidegger. In Heidegger’s seminars on Der Ister, for instance, ‘Intimating, and especially 
those who are full of intimation, extend and proceed simultaneously into what is coming and 
what has been…’54 The Ister commentary is one of a series on Holderlin’s late hymns to 
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rivers and to forms of memory in the 1940s, all of which meditate on temporality – not as a 
linear condition of history, but as a domain through which notions of source, origins or 
destiny, which appear to be lost to the present, may yet be intimated as returning, or capable 
of being returned to, the source of ontological redemption. Spectres of Marx, for instance, 
adopts Heidegger’s description of  the Anwesende which ‘lingers in this transitory passage 
(Weile)... between what goes and what comes, in the middle of what leaves and what 
arrives’.55 We are witnessing a partial mutation of deconstruction’s critical horizon in the 
direction of Heideggerean ontology.  
 
 
IV 
 
Why does the uncanny turn spectral, and the spectral ‘ontological’, and why at this point in 
1987-1989, does Derrida return to these Heideggerean formulations of the late-1930s-1940s? 
Why indeed do these concepts of uncanny temporalities, ghosts and ‘hauntology’ strike such 
a chord in the study of culture at this point? There is no secret that Spectres of Marx was 
conceived originally as a submission to a conference in 1993 entitled ‘Whither Marxism? 
Global Crises in International Perspective’. In a companion volume, Bernd Magnus and 
Stephen Cullenberg make clear that original context for these discussions was the crumbling 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which brought with it ‘a 
vague sense of foreboding, a haunted sense’ that changes of such magnitude would result in 
malign and benign transformations in global culture as a whole.56 It is from this point on that 
the uncanny is transposed from psychological, aesthetic and philosophical domains to 
politics, sociology and history. For Royle deconstruction now becomes ‘the opening to 
freedom, responsibility, decision, ethics and politics,’57 while the uncanny is linked to ‘the 
historical and political experiences of class, race or age’ and the experience of imperialism 
and colonialism.58 Wolfreys sees the spectre as ‘that which haunts politics when… politics is 
nothing other than the law and the system’,59 while Masschelein emphasises the uncanny’s 
links to alienation as an economic, political and psychological condition.60 
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There has been very little attempt to read these overtures for a new uncanny ethics or politics 
back against the particular transformations of the 1990s in which Marx is exchanged for 
Heidegger – or indeed to probe the Heideggerean influx into uncanny theory in its own 
political context of the 1930s-40s. A notable absence in the many returns to Spectres of Marx 
is Derrida’s previous Of Spirit – a book in which the enigmatic relation to time was already 
explored and consolidated with his evolving interest in the uncanny and the spectral: ‘His 
step carries him into the night, like a revenant’.61 It is also a book which aimed to exonerate 
Heidegger’s anti-metaphysical turn in the 1940s as a redemptive model for cultural and 
political theory at the end of the twentieth century.  
 
In what follows I want to explore these links in two ways: one is to make the point that 
Heidegger’s turn to the uncanny is already an older gesture, and a metaphysical one, which 
repeats motifs within Romantic philosophy; the second is that the anti-conceptualism of the 
uncanny is itself a transcendant gesture, and, moreover, one which is not ultimately distinct 
from the language of uncanny origins and the violent eruption of truth – a politics in sublime 
mode – which marks the messianism of Heidegger’s encounter with Nazism, rather than 
being the prophylaxis against it. 
 
Consider the emergent eschatology in these tropes: the concealed dimension of time as bearer 
of a displaced and enigmatic promise of redemption. Karl Löwith criticised Heidegger’s 
‘historiological futurism’ and its remote and disguised dependence on Christian 
eschatology.62 In an interview with Maurizio Ferraris (1996) Derrida himself invoked ‘a 
reaffirmation of the eschatological and messianic as a structured relation to the future’;63 
likewise in Spectres of Marx, the ‘democratic promise’ will always keep an ‘absolutely 
undetermined messianic hope at its heart, this eschatological relation to the to-come of an 
event’64. People might concede the figure of the temporal as a neutral one which de facto 
must accompany uncanny theory’s turn to the historical, which forms the basis for a new 
address to politics. But if justice is temporalised beyond all living present, this 
temporalisation transcends historiography. Instead, a kind of infinite justice – boundless, 
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‘absolutely non-reappropriable’65 – is conceived in relation to the present as something dis-
junct from it; it is in effect given a figurative place beyond the present: the infinite outside the 
finite. This relation is then mythically concretised as a strata of time (the absolutely anterior, 
the ‘to come’). The past and future become the crypt and heaven of abstraction, of infinitude, 
of ‘democracy’ in ideal mode, with the uncanny and the spectral as the ghostly messengers 
linking us to alternative and unthinkable possibilities.  
 
There is a philosophical genealogy for this way of thinking the absolute, the ontology of the 
boundless in contradistinction to the formal and objectified or conceptualised ‘present’, as an 
uncanny rift in time. It is one of the ironies of the many returns to Freud and Hoffmann, in 
order to elaborate uncanny histories, that none of them follow the lead back to F. W. J. 
Schelling to its ultimate conclusion. It is Schelling who yields Freud his definition of the term 
‘uncanny’ (for Masschelein it is throughout the ‘Freudian uncanny’) and it was Schelling and 
G. H. Schubert’s romantic philosophies of nature which Hoffmann had been reading in the 
months before his work on ‘The Sandman’.66 In 1811, Schelling began work on a new 
philosophy of time, The Ages of the World, whose major innovation is that it attempts to 
reconfigure the idealist notion of ‘the absolute’ as a being whose absolute nature is 
materialised and truncated in time, so that its essence is concealed in the unconscious past 
which secretly grounds the form of the present. What founds the present is more powerful 
and boundless than it (‘hauntology’ is ‘larger and more powerful than an ontology’),67 while 
no freedom will emerge except in a future that radically disturbs the categories of the present 
(‘a future which does not allow itself to be modalized... into the form of the present’ ).68 
Time, for Schelling, thus girdles the present with an eschatological structure in a very similar 
manner to Heidegger and Derrida’s formulations. The latent and ontologically ‘missing’ force 
of the absolute was approached by Schelling in the 1810s through metaphors of concealed 
and unbearable primeval chaos, madness or fire. But in his lectures on mythology of the 
1840s (in the context of yet another period of political reaction) Schelling returned to this 
notion of a repressed ontological ground haunting the present as the ‘uncanny’: ‘what one 
                                                          
65
 Derrida, Truth of the Secret, p21. 
66
 See Matt ffytche, The Foundation of the Unconscious: Schelling, Freud and the Birth of the Modern Psyche, 
Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp149-161, 186-188. 
67
 Derrida, Spectres, p10.  
68
 Royle, ‘What is Deconstruction’, p11. 
15 
 
calls everything that should have stayed secret, hidden, latent, but has come to the fore’ – the 
definition which enters Freud’s text in 1919.69  
 
Schelling, in the 1810s-1840s already had his ghosts, his uncanny dimensions of the 
unconscious, the barely intimated and inarticulable, and they are metaphysical through and 
through – a holding-place for religious and metaphysical concepts of the absolute within a 
seemingly secular vocabulary of time. Though Royle names Derrida’s messianism as a 
‘messianism without religion’, as a ‘structure of experience’70 one could argue that this is still 
experience structured as religion would have it, with invocations of the infinite, and of 
incalculable forms of justice and community. Spectres of Marx is packed with such overtures 
to the infinite: ‘the infinite promise’, ‘untimeliness of the infinite surprise’, ‘without this 
experience of the impossible, one might as well give up on both justice and the event’.71 
Spivak in the companion volume to Spectres of Marx describes communism as a ‘figuration 
of the impossible which Derrida’s work allows us to call a spectrality’.72 As Jay pointed out a 
decade ago, it may not be enough ‘to say that hegemonic attempts at closure necessarily call 
up their spectral others... when those others are themselves no less – and may be more – 
problematic versions of the same desire for wholeness’.73 
 
V 
 
There is a second point here: that this sublime and boundless justice – ‘the excess of justice 
with respect to the accounted for’74 – at the same time threatens to make void the 
discriminated values and particular injustices of the present, and indeed, to empty such values 
of their possible social meaning. Derrida alerts us to ‘the necessarily inadequate form of 
whatever has to be measured against this promise – the infinite respect of the singularity and 
infinite alterity of the other’.75 But such thus threatens to make particular political positions 
and ethical choices indifferent. What I want to suggest, then, is that this ethics and politics in 
dialogue with the uncanny which emerges in the 1990s is vitiated by a tendency towards 
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abstraction (too idealised a concept of ‘justice’ and ‘democracy’), and that to opt for critical 
theory in a sublime style – one which seeks to destabilise more contingent knowledge, and 
invoke the agency of obscurity in history – disables the mechanisms for judging ethical and 
political alternatives at precisely the point at which (1930-1945; 1989-1991) political 
hegemonies are undergoing seismic transformations. 
 
The figures of the ghostly and the uncanny tend towards abstraction in a number of ways. 
Firstly, they characteristically remove themselves from implication in any domain of 
demarcated objects, relations and identities: the ‘to come’ is not yet categorized or 
programmed; the spectral escapes ‘positivist or constructivist logic’,76 just as for Heidegger 
the ultimate and abysmal in man ‘can never be discerned through the mere description that 
establishes data’.77 This tendency manifests itself on the ground of ethics as an appeal against 
the specific terms of legal or ethical distinctions operative in particular situations. For Royle, 
‘justice necessarily “exceeds law and calculation”’;78 Derrida’s concern for justice is, ‘Not 
for calculable equality, therefore, not for the symmetrising and synchronic accountability or 
imputability of subjects or objects’79 (compare Heidegger’s critique of ‘the they’, which 
‘knows only the satisfying of manipulable rules and public norms... It reckons up infractions 
of them and tries to balance them off,’).80 Or again, justice ‘must carry beyond present life, 
life as my life or our life. In general.’81  
 
As a way of demonstrating the effects of such abstraction in the context of the ‘political 
uncanny’, I want to turn to Derrida’s defence of Heidegger’s anti-metaphysical position in Of 
Spirit, which, significantly enough, turns on a description of the Unheimlich in the final 
section of An Introduction to Metaphysics, written in 1934, a section which ends notoriously 
enough with references to Niezsche’s transvaluation of all values and the suggestion that ‘the 
works that are being peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism’ have 
nothing to do with ‘the inner truth and greatness of this movement (namely the encounter 
between global technology and modern man)’.82 In this final chapter, Heidegger argues that 
the violence of the uncanny should be distinguished from common usage in which ‘violence 
                                                          
76
 Wolfreys, Victorian Hauntings, px. 
77
 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p149. 
78
 Royle, What is Deconstruction, p4. 
79
 Derrida, Spectres, p22-3. 
80
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p334. 
81
 Derrida, Spectres, pxx. 
82
 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p199. 
17 
 
is seen from the standpoint of a realm which draws its standards from conventional 
compromise and mutual aid’;83 he also asserts that the Greeks, ‘Pre-eminent in the historical 
place’ are ‘without statute and limit, without structure and order, because they themselves as 
creators must first create all this’.84  
 
The defence revolves around the question of whether Geist (which might stand for ‘spirit’ in 
the Hegelian, or Christian sense; or mind, or ‘spiritedness’, or ghost) can be shifted away 
from its multiple implications in the history of metaphysics, particularly in German idealism. 
Derrida argues that the difference between geistig and geistlich (both meaning ‘with’ or ‘of’ 
the spirit) is ‘inscribed in contexts with a high political content’; in fact, ‘It perhaps decides 
as to the very meaning of the political as such’.85 What Geist in Heidegger might possibly 
shift towards (this is what Derrida is trying to ascertain) is a more ‘ghostly’ address – which 
figures itself not as governing reason, or as the voice of the metaphysical subject, but simply 
as temporality, historicality, a listening into the ‘to come’. ‘L’avenir’, the ‘spectral’ and the 
‘uncanny’ are already bonded in this text. 
 
Here is the key passage in which Derrida raises the issue of Nazism, in the context of a 
critique of ‘spirit’ and its ‘revenance’ – that is, in the context of the passage from 
metaphysics to uncanny theory: 
 
Because one cannot demarcate oneself from biologism, from naturalism, from racism 
in its genetic form, one cannot be opposed to them except by reinscribing spirit in an 
oppositional determination, by once again making it a unilaterality of subjectity, even 
if in its voluntarist form. The constraint of this program remains very strong, it reigns 
over the majority of discourses which, today and for a long time to come, state their 
opposition to racism, to totalitarianism, to nazism, to fascism, etc., and do this in the 
name of spirit, and even of the freedom of (the) spirit, in the name of an axiomatic – 
for example, that of democracy or ‘human rights’ – which, directly or not, comes back 
to this metaphysics of subjectity.86 
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The implications and syntax of this passage are complex – it is not immediately apparent, for 
instance, what Derrida is saying about the relations between biologism, Nazism and 
humanism. And this is, already, what makes it in many ways a troubling, or frustrating 
passage. There seem to be two critiques mapping over each other. The first could be called a 
critique of the bad ‘-isms’ – biologism, naturalism, racism. Why are these bad? Because they 
seek to objectify the possibilities of ethico-political life in terms of concrete categories, 
differentiations and exclusions. In this context they evoke Heidegger’s critiques of the 
‘ontic’, as opposed to the ontological; the association also suggests the emerging juridical 
categories of bio-power, traced two years later in relation to the concentration camp by 
Giorgio Agamben in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. It is here that we might 
comfortably seek to inscribe Nazism, with its racialist and eugenicist programmes.  
 
However, the object of Derrida’s critique is not simply Nazism, but something far broader 
than this: it is both the culture of conceptualisation and objectification, as well as the 
‘spiritualisation of thinking’, per se. For Derrida, ‘one cannot demarcate oneself from 
biologism, from naturalism, from racism’, or oppose them, except by ‘reinscribing spirit in an 
oppositional determination’ – ie, except by separating out something transcendent, in 
opposition to these cruder objectifications. But this once again threatens the return of spirit 
[Geist] as a ‘unilaterality’ or ‘metaphysics of subjectity’.  That is to say, any discourse aiming 
to separate itself out from such coercive ‘isms’, by appealing to more ideal or spiritual 
categories, inherently reimplicates it in a history of metaphysics (Christian, rationalist, or 
idealist) and hence in deployments of power and the reimposition of coercive regimes. It is 
perhaps here, that Nazism is inscribed, too: as a metaphysic of subjectity in voluntarist form, 
ie., a will to power, a transvaluation of values. And this gives us a new set of alignments: next 
to ‘racism’ we now have, not simply biologism and naturalism, but ‘totalitarianism… 
Nazism… fascism’. But here comes the crucial shift: the real object of critique within this 
passage is not Nazism or fascism but the debased reinscription of spirit, the metaphysics of 
subjectity, made ‘in the name of an axiomatic – for example, that of democracy or “human 
rights”’. 
 
The more absolutely ethics centres on the final drama of overcoming the language of 
‘presence’, the more differentiated political phenomena (fascism, liberalism, humanism) 
become elided, or exchangeable. They are all equally vicious from the point of view of an 
‘infinite’ or unbounded justice – a justice that must transcend all social relations and 
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distinctions. This gesture was reinforced in ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of 
Authority”’ (originally delivered at a colloquium in 1989) in which Derrida argued that 
Walter Benjamin would have judged ‘any juridical trial of Nazism’ as vain, likewise ‘any 
judgmental apparatus, any historiography still homogenous with the space in which Nazism 
developed up to and including the final solution’.87 But this homogeneity appears also to 
implicate: ‘any interpretation drawing on philosophical, moral, sociological, psychological or 
psychoanalytical concepts, and especially juridical concepts’,88 that is to say, from almost any 
possible critical position within the humanities, juridical and social sciences apart from the 
‘uncanny’.  
 
And yet it is not hard to see how the ghostly alternative – the very terms of the uncanny 
temporalities (Zukunft or avenir) which gesture beyond the metaphysics of presence – can 
themselves, as already noted, be easily re-implicated, both in their own metaphysical tradition 
(going back through Heidegger to Schelling, and beyond this to the negative theology of 
Boehme, Tauler and Eckhart, where its Christian roots are clearly evident), but also in the 
appeal to Nazism. When, in his 1942 in lectures on Hölderlin’s ‘Der Ister’ Heidegger 
opposes the uncanny to an ontology based on quantification, he makes it clear that this 
problem concerns the historic encounter between Germany, Bolshevism and Americanism, an 
encounter in which ‘ahistoricality and historicality are decisively at issue’.89 Historicality, 
here, is taken to mean the sublime and German ontology of destiny; as opposed to the 
impoverished language of Being in Russia and America, bound up with equivalence 
(democracy, communism) and instrumentalisation. 
 
Derrida, in Spectres, makes very lengthy reference to Heidegger’s exploration of time as dis-
jointure (Unfug or adikia), aligning his own notion of ethical justice with this concept of ‘dis-
jointed or dis-adjusted time without which there would be neither history, nor event, nor 
promise of justice’,90 and ‘on the basis of which we are trying here to think the ghost’.91 This 
dis-adjustment (in which is already inscribed the logic of anti-conceptualism which will guide 
uncanny theory in the 1990s and 2000s) is removed from its violent contextual implication in 
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Heidegger’s texts of the 30s and early 40s, but still invoked as a ‘Violence of the law before 
the law and before meaning, violence that interrupts time, disarticulates it, displaces it out of 
its natural lodging: “out of joint”’.92 The displacement from ‘natural lodging’ recalls the 
German term Unheimlich, just as ‘out of joint’ purposefully evokes the ghost in Hamlet, 
Derrida’s figurative doorway onto spectral and uncanny ethics and temporalities at the 
opening of Spectres of Marx. Derrida constantly affirms Heidegger’s insistence on thinking 
‘Dikē on this side of, before, or at a distance from the juridical-moral determinations of 
justice’.93 He adds: ‘What if disadjustment were on the contrary the condition of justice?’94  
 
Derrida is making reference to Heidegger’s essay on Anaximander from 1946 (the postwar 
year) and the point was perhaps that, rueing his engagement with fascism in the early 1930s, 
Heidegger’s turn to the uncanny opened the path for a thinking beyond political immediacy, 
and beyond the objectifications of political will per se. Perhaps something akin to this 
transition, from political identification to historical and philosophical mourning (in which 
Heidegger and Benjamin are made to hold hands), was now proffered for those who felt the 
certainties of Marxism and communism implode at the end of the 1980s. And yet exactly the 
same constellation of terms Unheimlich, dikē and Unfug [dis-jointure] already appears at the 
heart of the Introduction to Metaphysics of 1935, where it is invoked violently, and as a 
condition for a higher ontology and a more radical assertion of historical community.95 In the 
even more overtly fascistic Rectoral Address of 1933, Heidegger again disdains the ‘arsenal 
of useful knowledge and values’, and ‘objectivity’, in order to invoke the power to 
overwhelm and disturb the conditions of existence, so that the Volk may embark ‘on the way 
to its future history’.96  
 
My point here is not to establish some ad hominem link between the uncanny and fascism. 
Rather, what I think the foregoing brings out is that tropes which foreground the anti-
conceptual, the non-objectifiable, and the uncanny, do not by virtue of this transcend either 
metaphysics or violent and coercive political implication. Derrida’s ‘infinite justice’, it will 
be remembered, was both a name for the Islamic God and a codeword for the bombardment 
of Afghanistan. What is required, surely, is vigilance over the use of terms in particular 
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concrete, historical and ethical situations, rather than the attempt to transcend that violence 
through the invocation of a counter-trope, Masschelein’s ‘unconcept’, in which all logics are 
equated (Benjamin = Heidegger; Marx = Freud; Nazism = liberalism). 
 
VI 
 
I’ve followed a very particular argument here, which is that what radicalised the uncanny in 
the 1990s was its merging with the ‘spectral’ and the implication of both in a new counter-
ontology, or counter-historiography, which was taken up in cultural and sociological work. It 
is this aspect which underlies the differentiation of uncanny theory from psychoanalysis 
(which, whether post-Freudian, Kleinian or Lacanian, has its own ways of theorising the 
psychical investments in social and historical relationships, more likely to turn on concepts of 
fantasy and projection). Equally, the historical and ontological turn, and the emphasis on the 
sublime, differentiates the uncanny from earlier deconstruction. The investigation then 
focused on the ethical and political mobilisation of the uncanny within Derrida’s engagement 
with Heidegger. Here the generalised, redemptive and disturbing condition of the uncanny 
finds itself disturbingly reflected and inverted in examples of political catastrophe which it is 
powerless to judge, oppose, or name, because its ethos and its message is the refusal of 
objectification. This is not the only narrative one could extract from the uncanny in 
contemporary theory (though both Royle and Wolfreys emphasise the significance of Derrida 
and the associations with temporality, history and ethics). However, I could have approached 
this investigation from a very different angle and would still have come up against the issue 
of abstraction and the collapse of differentiation. To illustrate this, I want to draw a brief 
parallel with an alternative depiction of the uncanny via a concentration on affect, which is 
not so emphasised in Derrida’s work, but is in Royle’s. 
 
Royle’s The Uncanny is self-consciously diverse in its approach, and its sense of irony and 
heterogeneity, as well as its humour, to a certain extent make it more of a playful and 
sceptical work than Derrida’s Spectres of Marx, and more resistant to the ethical messianism 
of that text (though this remains one of Royle’s many points of reference). One near constant 
implication of Royle’s book, however, is that the uncanny emerges as an experience, 
sensation or intuition. It ‘involves feelings of uncertainty, in particular regarding the reality of 
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who one is’, or ‘a feeling of uncanniness may come from curious coincidences’;97 it can be a 
‘flickering sense (but not conviction) of something supernatural’, or of ‘homeliness 
uprooted’.98 It can be ‘felt in response to witnessing epileptic or similar fits’ or ‘in response to 
dolls and other lifelike or mechanical objects’;99 or ‘involve a feeling of something strangely 
beautiful, bordering on ecstasy’, or an experience of déjà vu.100 Such feelings come above all 
‘in the uncertainties of silence, solitude and darkness’.101 Suddenly, ‘one’s sense of oneself’ 
may seem strangely questionable.102 
 
The concentration on affect and sensibility here (on materialisation within the experience of a 
person, rather than diffusion in the fabric of historicity) is markedly different from the 
approach of Derrida, but we are once again being pushed towards this strange realm of 
indifference and abstraction. And this seems a preposterous conclusion. How could the 
uncanny – which here stands for something entirely disturbing, and deeply affecting – be in 
any way abstract or indifferent? What I would suggest is that the emphasis on feeling and 
experiencing the uncanny in Royle reflects a desire to represent immediacy in experience – 
the uncanny is a disturbance apprehended via the affects of a subject that has not yet elicited 
the terms of what disturbs it. But this is more than a question of perceptual delay. The subject 
or individual will never arrive at such terms, for this would be to dissipate the uncanny. In his 
own essay on the uncanny, Freud recounts the incident in which, while alone in a sleeping 
compartment on a train, a sudden jolt made the door of the wash cabinet swing open giving 
rise to the appearance of an elderly gentleman in a dressing gown coming in. ‘Jumping up 
with the intention of putting him right’, Freud is dismayed to find that the intruder ‘was 
nothing but my own reflection in the looking-glass’.103 This incident is included by Freud as a 
stage in ‘reality-testing’. It is a moment of uncertainty, quickly resolved, though it may leave 
a lingering effect. By contrast, in Royle’s text, the subject of the uncanny will not move 
towards a reconstruction of the causes or conditions of the disturbance. The focus remains 
with the uncanny intuition itself, which is valorised precisely for its ability to ward off the 
impulse towards identification and categorization. We are geared once more for the opening 
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of a future ‘which does not allow itself to be modalized or modified into the form of the 
present’.104  
 
Royle’s uncanny immediacy is implicitly encountered from the point of view, not of a subject 
which is erased, but a lonely inner vantage point besieged by various kinds of foreignness and 
unfamiliarity, and which encounters all otherness as disturbance. It is worth pausing here, to 
consider the way in which these formulations grope towards, but are unable to ‘present’, an 
idea of mediation – in the following sense: ‘In order to know an object thoroughly, it is 
essential to discover and comprehend all of its aspects, its relationships and its “mediations”. 
We shall never achieve this fully, but insistence on all-round knowledge will protect us from 
errors and inflexibility’.105 In effect, the uncanny has become a word for everything that used 
to be thought under terms such as ‘mediation’, ‘intersubjectivity’, ‘relationship’ – its meaning 
‘may have to do most of all with what is not oneself, with others, with the world “itself”.106 
Any aspect of experience which involves wider relationships – sociological, linguistic, 
psychological, political – is at some point reassigned by Royle to the uncanny. They are now 
all primarily interesting for the way in which they are disturbing or inexplicable for the 
subject. All historical relations, all connections between people (technological or discursive) 
are in this sense ghostly. The uncanny appears to be the historical ghost of the thought of 
connection. Implicit in Royle’s account are the terms of a ‘problematisation’ of the self in 
relation to others and otherness. But because all the terms and links in this equation are now 
simply ‘uncanny’, the dilemma is resolved by elision. The uncanny absorbs all differences 
and makes them unthinkable, and at the same time, diffuse and interchangeable: they are all 
uncanny.  
 
There is a banal point here, which is that, through its own increasingly familiar presence in 
theory, the uncanny has lost its Verfremdungs effect (Brecht’s Verfremdungs effect is itself 
cited by Royle and Masschelein as another example of the uncanny).107 The piling on of 
horror effects might then reflect an anxious attempt to regain and resusbstantiate the 
experience of disturbance, which has lost its points of reference and become vague and 
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ubiquitous. There is a less banal point which is that by remaking all other theories in its own 
image – ‘everything in Marx… that has to do with notions of alienation, revolution and 
repetition, comes down to a thinking of the uncanny’;108 ‘The death drive is eerily uncanny, 
uncannily eerie’109 – forms of critical thought which originally gave more complex (including 
ambivalent and ironic) accounts of subjective and sociological tensions in modernity, and 
more complex accounts of the production of sociological differences, have been subsumed 
under vaguer definitions of malaise, estrangement, bewilderment, loss and anticipation. What 
does it mean to carry forward from Marxism the tenor of unreality and disturbance, rather 
than the critique of capitalist economy, the division of classes and the alienation of labour? 
What does it mean to carry forward from psychoanalysis into cultural theory a feeling of 
unreality and strangeness, rather than the analysis of subjectivity and of the subjective and 
social function of fantasy? 
 
To return to the situation of the early 1990s, one can see how the turn to the uncanny reached 
its apotheosis during a crisis in political and cultural theory, and that there was in the very 
turn to tropes of phantoms and spectres an invocation of a period of political mourning and 
remembrance, a melancholic introversion. However, there were serious dangers in the 
prolongation of this shift in critical idiom into something more than a temporary response. 
One danger was that, by merging aspects of deconstruction (its scepticism towards 
objectification) with something closer to a Heideggerean counter-ontology of history, the loss 
arising from a certain kind of political uncertainty (the collapse of communism, the 
apotheosis of an as yet unanalysed but increasingly triumphant neoliberalism) was too easily 
converted into a form of critical affirmation: the affirmation of the uncanny, in which the 
terms of political and sociological objectification might be refused and exchanged for a 
vaguer, and more sublime, historicality. Ubiquitous unease and confusion of boundaries 
becomes the site from which something altogether different and incalculable might emerge. 
Hence the general call to consolidate this abandonment of received political and social 
identities via the uncanny: ‘The uncanny is… a disturbance of the very idea of personal or 
private property including the properness of proper names, one’s own so-called “own” name, 
but also the proper names of others, of places, institutions and events.’110 The ‘disturbance’ 
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consolidated and reified as the ‘uncanny’ was then forced to carry the burden of what, 
previously, might have occasioned a political, psychoanalytic or post-colonial critique. 
 
There was also the danger that the Manichean severance of one set of tropes – the uncanny, 
the spectral, the dis-junct, the enigmatic – from the logic of names and laws associated with 
social or cultural objectification, would be conceived too naively or reductively. To one 
theoretical language is ascribed all coercion (presence is entirely alienating), to the other 
release, infinitude or a positive analytical complexity. But this is a very naive manner in 
which to re-imagine the ethical-political work of identification in criticism. As if the ethics of 
criticism could be materialised in a particular language or topos (the beyond, the to-come, the 
uncanny), like the Kleinian ‘good breast’, rather than in a difficult, forever imperfect, set of 
socio-political encounters and socio-political differentiations. 
 
Above all, in lieu of cultural analysis and critique, the uncanny has been sustained by a 
certain suggestiveness – the suggestion of other theories (Freud, Marx, Brecht, and so on); 
the suggestion of radicalism (as disturbance); the suggestion of psychological and 
sociological complexity; the suggestion of political and historical redemption (the 
unforeseeable, the nearly discovered) – at the same time as sociological details and critical 
paradigms have been leached away in favour of the elucidation of the uncanny itself. Does 
not the uncanny end up having more in common with the neoliberal culture it set out to resist, 
accommodated to passivity, to half-elucidation, to bewilderment, and to the possible, just 
where greater vigilance was needed? In uncanny criticism, community and radicalism take on 
a phantom existence – ubiquitously surmised; nowhere effectively materialised. Perhaps in a 
context of dwindling resources and marching instrumentalization within academia, uncanny 
theory may yet become re-radicalised – might stake out a ground and a purpose, rather than 
await the emergence of history from the night of the unexpected. 
 
